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ARGUMENT

I.

Pace Has Correctly Stated the Proper Standard for Summary
Judgment, and Factual Issues Exist That Preclude Summary
Judgment•

LRP has contended that Pace has "conveniently" omitted or
misstated facts, skewing them in his favor, and that Pace has
misstated the standard for summary judgment.

The facts that LRP

refers to, particularly the statement that an LRP employee was the
"lead man on this job", speak to LRP's supervision over Pace. Any
conflicting factual disputes surrounding the relationship between
LRP and Pace show that summary judgment was inappropriate, as such
conflicts must be resolved in favor of Pace, the nonmoving party.
Pace has made no effort to avoid or "omit" LRP's characterization
of the facts, but rather has exercised his right as the nonmoving
party to present the facts in a light most favorable to him.
As to the correct standard

for summary

judgment, Pace

acknowledges that when the nonmoving party presents opposing
evidence that is insufficient as a matter of law, summary judgment
is warranted, even when the issue concerned normally cannot be
resolved at summary judgment. See, e.g.f Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow
Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991); Sorenson v. Hartford Accident
and Life Ins. Co. , 585 P.2d 440, 441-42 (Utah 1978); see also,
Hussev Gay & Bell v. Georgia Ports Authority, 420 S.E.2d 50, 52-53
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992) .

This requirement makes sense in that it

ensures the bona fides of a dispute.

1

LRP appears to claim that there was no bona fide dispute here
because Pace has failed to present
conflict.

evidence

of any

factual

In doing so LRP relies on a strained reading of Ghersi

v. Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1994).

LRP contends that Ghersi

held that the nature of the employment relationship could be
determined on summary judgment, and in so arguing notes that Ghersi
"specifically" rejected Novenson v. Spokane Culvert & Fabricating
Co.,

588

P.2d

1174

(Wash.

1979)(which

held

that

employment

characterization issues are not normally resolvable on summary
judgment) and "explicitly" held that facts concerning the terms and
manner of the employment relationship could be determined on
summary judgment.
This is not so. Ghersi cited Novenson with a "but see" signal
to illustrate that there are instances when an inference from the
facts and circumstances is inappropriate because
circumstances
opinion

does

themselves
not

are

reveal

a subject
whether

the

of dispute
all

of

the

facts

and

(the Novenson
circumstances

surrounding the worker's employment were undisputed, as the Ghersi
opinion did).

The facts in Ghersi were undisputed.

One may make

inferences from undisputed circumstances on summary judgment—that
is what Ghersi concludes.

One cannot, however, resolve

factual

disputes and then make inferences from the findings.
Here there are disputes that cannot be resolved at summary
judgment, evidence of which is certainly sufficient to create a
bona fide dispute.

One dispute already mentioned concerns the

amount of control LRP could exert over Pace.

2

Another is whether

LRP paid workers' compensation premiums.1 LRP claims that evidence
of such payment was readily available to Pace.

It is not Pace's

duty to prosecute LRP's defense. The only evidence of any kind in
the record

of payments between LRP and ELI is that referred to in

Pace's initial brief.

LRP produced nothing else, neither to Pace

or the district court.

If there were such evidence, it is not in

the record, and that is LRP's fault.2

II.

LRP Has Not Met the Three Ghersi Criteria Required for LRP
to be Immune.

A.

There

Was No Contract

Between

LRP and

Pace.

Pace has argued that there was no contract, express or
implied, between LRP and him because the elements of contract did
not exist.

LRP suggests that an "implied" contract does not need

those basic elements: offer, acceptance and consideration. LRP is
wrong.

There must be an offer and an acceptance, even of an

implied contract between a special employer and employee, because

1

With respect to payment of premiums, LRP has attacked Pace's
interpretation of Ghersi, arguing that the payments made from the
special employer to the general employer in Ghersi did not include
any pro rata allocation for workers' compensation. Language from
Ghersi refutes LRP's argument: "Huish [special employer] paid an
hourly fee to Adia [general employer] with the understanding that a
portion of the fee would be used to purchase workers' compensation
insurance for the temporary employees." Ghersi, 883 P.2d at 1358.
Huish was bound to pay Adia under contract, so even if Huish made
payment after the accident (a fact unclear from the opinion), it was
still bound with the contractual obligation to do so. No such
contractual obligation existed in this case.
2

Thus, to LRP's contention that Pace has made an ipse
dixit
denial, Pace responds inopia non curat lex (the law does not remedy
a dearth).

3

the employee is relinquishing his right to sue the special employer
by entering into it.

Ghersi, 883 P.2d at 1357.

Choice

is the

criterion emphasized in Ghersi. and an act of acceptance evidences
such choice (even if merely implied) . Pace did not choose

to work

for LRP.
LRP cites no cases in which choice prevailed over submission
(apart from Ghersi. in which the choice was obvious and part of the
entire temporary employment relationship).

In contrast, Pace has

cited cases that paint a spectrum between choice and submission.
The cases indicate that Pace submitted to ELI and did not choose to
work for LRP.

Bourette demonstrated submission (instruction to

help with repairs), as did Fisher (one cannot "choose" to work for
an undisclosed special employer). Submission is key: "[Control or
right to control the servant's physical conduct] must create a
relationship of subordination between the borrowing master and the
borrowed

servant rather than a relationship

of cooperation."

Pichler v. Pacific Mechanical Constructors, 462 P.2d 960, 963
(Wash. Ct. App. 1969)(no control by special employer found—servant
on site per general employer's instructions).
Pace had to do what he was told by ELI. So did the workers
in the above cases and in the other cases that Pace cited.

He did

what he was told, and did so when requested by his general
employer.

Such conduct is not unusual—it is expected.

LRP has

failed to show that Pace had the choice to enter into any kind of
contractual relationship with LRP.

4

B.

The Work Was Not Essentially

That

of

LRP.

Pace argued in his initial brief that his work was not
"essentially" that of LRP because it benefitted ELI.

The Larson

treatise requires exclusivity, and LRP's position fails absent
exclusivity. LRP disagrees, ascribing a colloquial meaning to the
term "essential" instead of the technical meaning given the term in
the Larson text.

LRP's argument is unfounded.

As pointed out in

Pace's initial brief, Professors Larson coined the use of the term
"essential" and also authored the exclusivity premise. If Larsons
use the terms interchangeably, then LRP must also.

really

If LRP

wishes to wax philological (unlikely), then one could argue that
"essential",

coming

from

the

root

elemental, which connotes exclusivity.

"essence",

really

means

But there is no point in

speculating how many meanings can dance on the language of the
statute, since the law is clear on this point.

Essentially means

exclusively.
C.

LRP Did Not Have the

Right

to

Control

Pace.

LRP cites a number of cases, including Avila v. Northrup King
Co., 880 P.2d 717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994), for the proposition that
LRP had the right to control Pace. Avila simply got the law wrong.
It stated,
[I]n the non-labor contractor cases, where an
employer merely loans an employee and does not provide
special equipment, the majority rule is that the loaned
employee becomes the employee of the special employer.
IB Larson, supra, § 48.23, at 8-515. Consequently, even
in the absence of a labor contractor relationship between
EMCO, Avila, and Northrup, substantial precedent exists
for holding that Avila is a lent employee of Northrup.

5

Avila, 880 P. 2d at 724.

Below is reproduced the section of the

Larson treatise cited by Avila (italicized section is text that
occurs on page 8-515).
§ 48.23 General employer in business of furnishing
employees
The closest cases are those in which the business of
the general employer consists largely of the very process
of furnishing equipment and employees to others. When,
for example, a truck owner furnishes trucks and drivers,
or cranes and operators, at a profit to himself for the
regular use of the special employer, it might at first
seem that the bulk of the work being done is that of the
special employer, and special employers have been held
liable in these circumstances. Sometimes this result is
produced in part by the fact that the special employer
alone possesses a license to engage in interstate
hauling. In a South Carolina case, Jordan Motor Lines
leased a truck and claimant driver to defendant Coker
Freight Lines.
Coker had a license to operate in
interstate hauling; Jordan did not. The ICC regulation
of November 23, 1956, under which Coker operated stated
that every lease of vehicles "Shall provide for the
exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment,
and for the complete assumption of responsibility in
respect thereto. . . ."
The court, relying heavily on the responsibility so
assumed under ICC rules, held Coker to be a special
employer. The amount of control exercised by Coker does
not seem to have gone beyond specifying cargo,
destination and route. But the responsibility legally
assumed by Coker under the ICC regulation supplied the
main basis for the decision.
But it is also possible to say that the owner is
advancing his own business, which is simply the business
of furnishing such equipment and labor for profit, and,
particularly when the facts show ultimate retention of
control for the protection of expensive equipment, it is
quite common to find the general employer remaining
liable.
If, however,
the general employer merely
arranges
for labor without heavy equipment,
the majority
of the
cases hold that the worker becomes the employee of the
special
employer,
although there is substantial contra
authority. For example, employers obtaining workers from
the kind of labor service typified by Manpower, Inc. have
usually, but not invariably, been held to assume the
status of special employer.

6

IB Arthur Larson & Lex Larson, Larson's Workmens' Compensation Law
§

48.23,

at

8-496

to

8-532

(footnotes

omitted)(hereinafter

"Larson").
It is obvious that the Avila court cited Larson out of context
and misapplied and misconstrued Larson's language.

Section 48-23

deals specifically with "labor contractors" (suppliers of temporary
or leased employees), and does not apply to "non-labor contractor
cases" as Avila states. Indeed, every one of the 43 cases cited by
Larson in footnote 65 in support of their "majority rule" argument
is a labor contractor case, as are the 18 contra

cases cited in

footnote 65.1. It may be that footnotes were the log tripping the
Avila court: they are so voluminous that in section 48.23 they take
up all of pages 8-497, -498, -499, -500, -501, -502, -506, -507, 509, -510, -511, -512, -513, -514, -516, -517, -518, -519, -520, 521, -523, -524, -525, -526, -527, -529, -530, and -531. It is no
wonder that an attorney or judge could miss the central theme of
the

section—"General

Employer

in

Business

of

Furnishing

Employees"—when the text is so disjointed.
LRP cited Avila and the other cases accompanying it—Sorenson,
Nation, Rivera, Rodriguez, and Blacknall—in an effort to liken
this case to Ghersi.

All of the cited cases, however, are just

like Ghersi in that they concern temporary employees lent by labor
contractors or providers.

They do not bridge the gap between the

situation in Ghersi, where the right to control by the special
employer was obvious, and the situation here, where it was not.
The fact that the borrowed servant obeys the requests of
the borrowing employer as to the act involved does not
necessarily cause him to be the servant of such borrowing

7

employer. Such obedience indeed may be obedience to a
noncoercive request of the borrowing employer or the
request may be in the nature of information given to the
borrowed servant in a cooperative effort to get the job
done.
Pichler v. Pacific Mechanical Constructors, 462 P.2d 960, 963
(Wash. Ct. App. 1969).
Answering LRP's specific contentions, LRP did not

have the

right to control where, when and how Pace was to carry out his
assignment, since the assignment was made by ELI and specified its
location

and

content.

As

noted

above,

the

"lead

man"

characterization is a subject of dispute, and the contention of
LRP's president that Pace was under LRP's exclusive supervision and
control is self-serving and incredible.
In short, non-labor contractor cases like this one require the
application of the enumerated criteria, as argued in Pace's initial
brief.

Such analysis leads to the conclusion that LRP was not an

employer immune from tort liability.

III.

The Joint Employment Doctrine Does Not Apply.

LRP, citing Araaon v. Clover Club Foods, 857 P.2d 250 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) , claims that it and ELI are so interrelated that
they should be treated as "joint employers." This case is nothing
like Araaon, or its predecessor, Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co. , 386
P.2d 616 (Utah 1963).

In Aragon a parent was found to be a joint

employer with it subsidiary; in Cook two joint venturers who were
helping each other build a tunnel were found to be joint employers.

8

While ELI and LRP do share a symbiotic relationship, they are
different businesses, and can in no way be characterized as
partners or joint venturers in the same sense as the companies in
Cook or Aragon.

ELI's success does not necessarily mean success

for LRP, or vice versa.

They are not linked in a "joint effort",

Aragon, 857 P.2d at 256, nor does one ultimately control the other
(as does a parent over a subsidiary) or have a substantial voice in
the other's dealings as to the joint objective (as is the case in
a partnership).
1105

See Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 510 P.2d 1104,

(Utah 1973)(joint venturers are akin to partners

in a

partnership).3
Finally, LRP contends that Pace could not be a "stranger to
the employment" because LRP "at times" borrowed Pace. LRP misreads
Aragon.

Only a "stranger to the employment" may be amenable

suit; an employee may always sue that stranger.
at 255.

to

Aragon, 857 P.2d

A tortfeasor can be a stranger—a victim cannot.

LRP

presumably wishes to contend that LRP cannot be a stranger to the
employment because it "at times" borrowed ELI employees, among them
Pace.

But this is not true.

LRP is a stranger to the employment

because it is not an employer or employee under the statute. If it
wishes to prove that it is an employer under the statute and avoid
being a stranger (its apparent goal), then it must show more than
frequent borrowing.

As has been demonstrated, it has not.

3

Pace has argued that LRP did not pay Pace's workers'
compensation benefits, a factor important to the Aragon court's
decision. Aragon, 857 P.2d at 256 (parent always is the ultimate
payor of subsidiary's workers' compensation coverage).
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IV.

The Lee Affidavit Should Be Stricken.

With respect to LRP's contention that Mr. Lee's assertions
concerning the employment relationship were proper and admissible,
the untenability of LRP's position is clear:
[T]he fact that Rivera's affidavit asserted that he had
no employment contract with Sagebrush and that he had not
been told he would be considered Sagebrush's employee for
purposes of the Act does not change [the result that
there was an implied contract of hire between Sagebrush
and Rivera]. See, e.g.. [English v. Lehigh County Auth.,
428
A.2d
1343,
1354
(Penn.
Super.
1981)]

(characterization
of relationship
does not control determination
relationship
exists).

by worker or employer
of whether employment

Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, 884 P.2d

832, 835

(N.M. Ct. App.

1994)(emphasis supplied).
As for LRP's argument that the best evidence rule need not be
satisfied with respect to payment records, it is once again not
Pace's duty to prosecute LRP's defense.

The supporting documents

(if any) should have been attached to the affidavit as exhibits.
Otherwise, Lee's statement violates the best evidence rule.

This

is true even if Lee could establish foundation that he knew what
was in the documents.

The best evidence rule can be violated—

indeed, is probably often violated—with testimony that has plenty
of foundation (i.e., "I have looked at the check seven times, and
the 'memo' portion said 'haircut.'"). Such testimony is simply not
good enough when the document is available.
violates the rule.
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Lee's statement

CONCLUSION

LRP has argued that it enjoys immunity, either under Ghersi or
Aragon.

LRP relies on testimony that is inadmissible and glosses

over significant factual disputes. Moreover, Aragon does not apply
to this case because LRP and ELI are not sufficiently related.
Ghersi's criteria apply, and LRP satisfies none of them.

LRP did

not have the right to control Pace, there was no contract of hire
between LRP and Pace, and the work that Pace was doing was not
essentially that of LRP.

LRP's arguments to the contrary lack

authority and speculate rather than substantiate. This case is not
like Ghersi. and on that basis the district court should be
reversed.
DATED this

;

D

day of May, 19|5.

PHILLIP E: LOWRlT
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

11

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
lv^ day of May, 1995.
Ford G. Scalley, Esq.
John E. Hansen, Esq.
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 /y->. (\

Mm

ATTORNEY

12

